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The Janus Model of Legal Regulation: Changes in the Political Status of Justice* 
 
Based on a social science perspective that gives priority to the political dimension of law and 
justice, this paper analyses three orientations of justice: as part of a rationalization process; as 
part of a democratization movement; and as part of a process of neoliberalization. From the 
analysis of these three types of legal regulation, two distinct forms of legal and judicial status may 
be identified in relation to the political: in the first, the legal-judicial is a central element in 
political regulation, while in the second it is instrumentalized by the political. The conclusion 
suggests that the existence of this Janus model of legal-judicial regulation points to a crisis in the 
political sphere.  
Keywords: Democratization; neoliberalism; rationalization of justice; judicial regulation; legal 
regulation; political regulation.  
 
Although there is a representation within the legal sphere concerning the possibility of self-
deteƌŵiŶatioŶ iŶ laǁ ;ďased oŶ ͞‘easoŶ͟Ϳ aŶd iŶ justiĐe ;ďased oŶ the ŶotioŶ of ͞faiƌŶess͟Ϳ, 
it is the responsibility of the social sciences to unveil what might be the social and political 
determinants of legal and judicial activity. This work of uncovering is all the more important 
as we live in a historical period in which actors in the legal and judicial spheres, like those 
operating in the political or state arena, cannot presume to impose a sole concept of law and 
justice.  
This is why it is particularly pertinent to draw on political sociology to address this matter. 
In fact, we need to break with the illusion that the status of law and justice depend only 
upon a voluntaristic policy on the part of the actors involved. This illusion allows us to 
assume that, in this domain as in others, governmental stimulation, intervention from the 
state and public authorities (whether or not inspired by jurists and magistrates, in 
accordance with the principle of top-down regulation) is enough to bring about an 
adjustment to the established objectives. Far from depending solely on the political will of a 
central authority that could be instructed in the appropriate course of action on the matter, 
the question of law and justice entails political, institutional, social and cultural challenges 
that have to be taken into account before any prescriptions can be made.  
For this reason, making use of a distinction that is common in the political sciences, I have 
replaced here the ĐoŶĐept of ͞puďliĐ poliĐǇ͟ ǁith that of ͞puďliĐ aĐtioŶ.͟ This replacement 
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identifies an analytical approach that takes account of the actions not only of public 
institutions but also of the various public and private actors in civil society and the 
governmental sphere who act jointly in multiple interdependencies at national, local and 
ultimately supranational level to produce forms of regulation of collective activities in 
matters of law and justice. Public action is the result of multiple configurations of 
interdependent relationships and interconnected strategies of actors, public action networks 
and action systems, in accordance with a decision-making scheme that results from an 
accumulation of negotiated regulations and power relations, and that takes place along 
intersecting, horizontal and circular lines, rather than obeying a linear or hierarchical logic 
(Commaille, 2009). This sociology of public action is simultaneously a political sociology. 
Indeed, there is nothing more political than law and justice, and nothing involves challenges 
that are more properly political (Commaille & Kaluszynski, 2007). More precisely, political 
soĐiologǇ seeks to ͞aŶalǇse politiĐal pƌoĐesses iŶ ƌelatioŶ to soĐietǇ͟ ďeĐause ͞a Đoŵplete 
analysis of politics, from the point of view of action, cannot be limited to a consideration 
only of the political sphere in the strict sense, while neglecting the other spheres of social 
action.͟ As Max Weber held, this involves studying ͞politiĐs iŶ its ƌelatioŶs ǁith the soĐial 
orders and social forces͟ ;DuƌaŶ, ϮϬϭϬͿ.  
This contextualization of law and justice becomes all the more important as our societies 
are facing real political, economic, social and cultural changes. Thus, the status of law and 
justice should be related to what I shall Đall a ͞detƌaditioŶalizatioŶ͟ ŵoǀeŵeŶt, afteƌ UlƌiĐh 
Beck (1992). In the so-Đalled ͞adǀaŶĐed͟ soĐieties, that status seeŵs to aƌise fƌoŵ ǁhat ǁe 
might call the crisis of conventionalism (Phaƌo, ϭϵϵϭͿ, the adǀeŶt of a ͞seĐoŶd ŵodeƌŶitǇ͟ 
;BeĐk, ϭϵϵϮͿ, of aŶ ͞adǀaŶĐed ŵodeƌŶitǇ͟ ;GiddeŶs, ϭϵϵϮͿ oƌ of a ͞liƋuid soĐietǇ͟ ;BauŵaŶŶ, 
2000). It results from the extinction of a dominant, the decline of ideologies, the questioning 
of large institutions, and particularly the weakening of framing and social control 
institutions. In this context, it is significant that, in a country such as France, the state should 
have moved from a position of dominance to one in which it is a partner in public action that 
arises from the (sometimes conflictual) participation of multiple public and private actors 
(Duran, 2010; Commaille & Jobert, 1998). 
As was anticipated and analysed in a masterly fashion by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
precisely with regard to law and justice (Sousa Santos, 1988; 2004), nothing better illustrates 
these mutations than the phenomenon of deterritorialization to which justice is exposed, or 
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in other words, the modification of its traditional territories of intervention (Commaille, 
2000). Just as institutionalized territories appear to be less and less relevant given the nature 
of the problems that arise, showing a growing maladjustment of the political system to 
citizens͛ needs and expectations, justice does not escape the new forms of interpellation 
arising from society. Justice as an institution is forced to submit to contingencies and admit 
that it is the actors embedded in specific territories that determine how problems are 
defined and how public institutions are coordinated.  
Justice was orgaŶized iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith the idea of ͞teƌƌitoƌies of puďliĐ poǁeƌ,͟ which 
is suďstaŶtiated iŶ FƌaŶĐe thƌough the eǆisteŶĐe of ͞Palaces of Justice,͟ together with other 
expressions of republican monumentality or transcendental power, like cathedrals. But 
these territories are now contested ďǇ ͞teƌƌitoƌies of ŵaŶageŵeŶt of soĐial pƌoďleŵs͟ 
(Duran, 2010), such as those constituted by urban spaces on the edge of large cities where 
problems of social segregation, ethnic repression and economic disadvantage are 
concentrated.  
This pressure of the local upon justice is accompanied in the opposite direction by a 
growing pressure from the supranational, corresponding to a destabilization of the 
territories of the nation-state: ͞A dialeĐtiĐ of gloďal aŶd loĐal has developed that tends to 
pass over intermediate levels, such as the natioŶ͟ (Veltz, 1998: 332). As regards the 
fragmentation of sovereignty and the segmentation of power that characterise 
contemporary societies, it is now necessary to implement multinational control mechanisms, 
particularly with regard to justice, that are able to deal with the atomization of practices that 
go beyond national level, for example in matters of economic regulation (Arnaud, 2003). The 
economic domain is precisely a case in point, given that the globalization of financial flows 
and the constitution of a transnational economic space take the form of multilateral 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ agƌeeŵeŶts, ͞ƌeĐoŶfiguƌiŶg productive apparatuses into a network,͟ freeing 
͞ĐoŵpaŶies fƌoŵ the poǁeƌ ƌelatioŶs pƌeǀiouslǇ Ŷegotiated at ŶatioŶal leǀel͟ aŶd forcing 
͞tƌade uŶioŶs of both North and South to rethink theiƌ ŵodes of aĐtiŶg͟.1  
In this context of change, the fate of justice is inseparable from that of law, which is 
simultaneously its reference and its instrument of action (i.e. associated with alterations to 
the status of law itself). For example, French justice was inspired by a legal rationality related 
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to a kind of transcendental Reason. From this perspective, the advent of the Republic did no 
more than perpetuate a certain idea of law, now related to the state instead of religion 
(Legendre, 1974). This law, which contributed to a pyramidal representation of political 
regulation, could only lead to the idea of a ͞JupiteƌiaŶ͟ ŵodel of justiĐe: ͞A pyramid takes 
shape, an impressive monument that draws the gaze irresistibly upward towards that focal 
point from which all justice radiates͟ ;Ost, 1992: 242). But this essentialist conception is 
increasingly giving way to a concept of legal reference that is more flexible, negotiated, 
relativistic and pragmatic, to the point of blurring the gap between Romano-Germanic law 
and common law, between law in books (which affirms a body of universal rules of justice 
based on a body of substantial law) and law in action (where the concern to find solutions 
appropriate for each case justifies the existence of a procedural justice whose emphasis is 
not so much on ends as on means and procedures to which actors resort to establish their 
objectives).  
These changes in legal activity connected to the change in the status of law are clearly 
observable in processes of law production. The law is increasingly the result of interventions 
by multiple actors and spheres (Commaille, 1994). Its production and application involve a 
negotiated process that authorizes a structure made more of organizational rules than 
norms of content (Lascoumes, 1994), giving rise to a continuous process of successive 
appropriations (Hawkins et al., 1984) or promoting obligations and incitements to negotiate 
at local level (Gavini, 1998). The redefinition of the status of the state and the growing 
impossibility of political power to impose legislation in accordance with its own principles of 
action create conditions for social movements and relevant actors to influence legislative 
processes, including the initiative to put them into practice (Commaille, 2006). In this 
context, the law is also likely to operate as a resource to which political power can resort 
after all other forms of legal-political management have been exhausted (Galembert, 2007). 
The present redefinitions of law and justice within the ambit of the social sciences 
illustrate these changes perfectly (Commaille, 2006). The certainties once held by the French 
sociology of law, largely a sociology of state law, have been shaken. Since we observe that 
͞the state as the ĐeŶtƌal eleŵeŶt of ƌegulatioŶ iŶ ŵodeƌŶ soĐieties is ďeiŶg ĐhalleŶged,͟ the 
problem of the status of law is raised to the extent that it has become an expression of state 
regulation (Duran, 1993) – and, consequently, the general orientations of the French 
sociology of law are also called into question. It may be significant that the anthropology of 
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law, in its classical posture, now appears better equipped to explain the current mutations. 
In truth, it has long conceived of societies where order derives from the society itself, 
thereby conceiving law as a function of the expectations, representations and practices of 
those that use it, as opposed to an approach to law and justice inspired by Western thinking, 
in which the structuring of the world is seen as an exclusive matter of those laws that are 
imposed from outside by a dominant omniscient authority.  
In these new perspectives of analysis, it would seem that the fates of law and justice are 
inseparable. We find ourselves in a context in which the law of intangible reference has 
become a resource appropriated by social actors in accordance with their own aims. For 
example, the hierarchy of rules may be challenged in order to impose the value of a 
collective convention upon that of a law (Ledoux, 2006). Legal appeal may be used in 
accordance with certain strategies, and in the context of a given configuration of power 
relations. In this context, the institutionalized place of justice is likely to turn into aŶ ͞aƌeŶa͟ 
(in the sense used by political scientists) in which different appropriations of that legal 
reference confront each other, and where the aim is not so much to obtain a favourable 
verdict as to help promote a cause or impose an issue as a matter for public debate by 
projecting it into the public sphere. Thus, justice becomes even more a space where 
strategies are manifested and compared, including those of the magistrates who do not 
want to submit their action to a strict legal positivism or to make it the result of a causal 
association between the ethos of their professional body and a certain type of political 
behaviour. The law is in fact a paƌaŵeteƌ of aĐtioŶ ǁith ǁhiĐh ŵagistƌates ĐaŶ also ͞plaǇ͟ 
(Osiel, 1995: 505, quoted by Israël, 2005). Thus, the concept of law that emerges is that of ͞a 
system of potentialities from which specific rule-mobilizing activities are plaǇed out͟ 
(Lascoumes, 1990: 50). In a context in which the idea of action is affirmed, in both political 
space and in the management of social and economic relations, as less an expression of a 
will than the result of multiple interrelations, of numerous exchanges between actors with 
diverging or contradictory interests, the law of reference becomes effectively a tool of action 
and eventually a means to which social actors or economic agents can resort.  
To stress in this way the extent of the transformations affecting law and justice does not 
mean to implicitly impose the idea of a linear evolution that could justify a kind of pseudo-
sociological prophetism. In this domain as in others, it is necessary to admit the existence of 
contradictory logics and, consequently, possible tensions between those logics, so that the 
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change is less a controlled end of a tendency and more what results, in part involuntarily, 
from the confrontation between possible logics.  
It is in this spirit that I focus upon the diverging orientations of justice, such as those that 
are manifested in the present, each one bringing a different fundamental conception of legal 
regulation as political regulation. Thus, I shall analyse in turn the forms taken by justice in (1) 
an economy of legal regulation as a process of rationalization, in (2) an economy of legal 
regulation as a process of democratization, and in (3) an economy of legal regulation as a 
process of neoliberalization. It remains to ask ourselves about the meaning that should be 
given to these different forms of legal regulation from the political point of view.  
 
1. Legal regulation as a process of rationalization 
Justice is increasingly compelled to aligŶ its ŵodes of oƌgaŶizatioŶ ǁith those of ͞ordinary͟ 
administrations. One of the great specificities of justice was its extraordinary capacity to 
cultivate its exceptionalism, which was measured, for example, by its obstinacy in defending 
an a-economic, a-financial and a-organizational view of its functioning. This was reproduced 
in a representation of magistrates as fulfilling a mission of justice in an a-mercantile space 
outside ordinary interests (Commaille, 2000). The representation of justice as an institution 
was inspired by the extraordinary nature of the functions it fulfilled, which had an implicit 
reference to the idea of transcendence (see, for example, law court architecture, rituals, 
etc). Attempts at reform in France thus reveal an opposition, which we could almost classify 
as fundamentally cultural, between a ministry of finance concerned with the rational use of 
resources and a ministry of justice clinging to the idea of preserving its position outside the 
common world and bureaucracy (Commaille, 2000). But, for some years now, some 
countries, and especially France, have seen the tendency to align justice with other public 
iŶstitutioŶs thƌough the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of the ͞Ŷeǁ puďliĐ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͟ ;“ĐhoeŶaeƌs, ϮϬϬϯ; 
Vigour, 2006). This concern seems to prevail over all others, particularly over the purposes of 
the mission of justice, to the point that political debates about justice are diluted in technical 
discussions about the organizational optimization of judicial practice (Vauchez & Willemez, 
2007).  
Hence, justice can no longer escape the historical processes of rationalization of public 
structures and is increasingly exposed to a process of vulgarization of its function, as can be 
seen in the observation that ͞justiĐe is a puďliĐ seƌǀiĐe.͟ A ͞ƌefoƌŵiŶg ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͟ has 
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thus been established (Vauchez & Willemez, 2007) in which notions of costs, efficacy, quality 
of production (assessment of performance indicators) and assessment of action are 
paramount. This implies a ͞logiĐ of ƌesults͟ and justifies the application of criteria of 
operational rationalization, cost reduction and ͞eĐoŶoŵies of sĐale͟ (as stipulated by the 
New Public Management) to ͞good ǁoƌk,͟ defiŶed iŶĐƌeasingly in accordance with an 
exogenous model that is valid for all administrations and that has been imported into justice 
(Bezes, 2009). This is illustrated, for example, by the experiments at rewarding performance, 
with the introduction of awards for the French magistrates of the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court of Judicature (Cour de Cassation) (Chellé, 2010).  
It is certainly this new general spirit of justice that favours the local initiatives on the part 
of magistrates to introduce technological innovations, including videoconferencing. A 
recently published report on the introduction of new technologies into the functioning of 
justice emphasises the fact that the expansion of videoconferencing is inescapable, and that 
the policy of developing this technique in legal proceedings has been based on the business 
management model. The arguments used are primarily related to the question of economy 
of means, in the context of a policy of justice that is increasingly becoming similar to a 
managerial policy (Dumoulin & Licoppe, 2009). This alignment of justice (till now so 
concerned with cultivating its exceptionalism) with the general tendency of all 
adŵiŶistƌatioŶs to iŶtƌoduĐe this ͞Ŷeǁ puďliĐ management͟ iŶto its oƌgaŶizatioŶ aŶd 
functioning contributes to a technicisation of justice and a correlative euphemisation of the 
political dimension.  
This alignment is part of the context of the so-called advanced industrial societies. The 
question of state reorientations in order to reduce public spending constitutes an element of 
the context in which justice policies are inscribed. In keeping with the desire of 
supranational organizations such as the World Bank to preserve, restore and promote the 
rule of law, there is also a concern with making the justice systems of different countries fall 
into step with the rationalization process described by Max Weber (1921), a process 
corresponding to modern capitalism's need for a reliable legal and judicial system, both for 
the stability of its jurisprudence and for the transparency of its procedures.  
It is significant that the justification of such a development can take the form of a 
doctrinal current applied to the legal and judicial sphere. This is manifested in the emphasis 
given to a concept of justice and law that we might call technocratic. For some authors, this 
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is a question of renouncing fixed, pre-established rules. In this perspective, law cannot 
continue to be considered an immutable reference, but rather an instrument of public 
policy, with rules inscribed in public action, that is, in the framework of a managerial model 
of government. In this regard, it is important to recognise the pertinence of the new legal 
doctrines and to break with a concept that implies loyalty to all pre-existing legal principles, 
in the name of a new vision of the state that demands a more active approach to law, an 
approach that can contribute to active policy making. In keeping with this doctrine, the 
growth of a bureaucratic state requires a mode of regulation that is no longer based on a 
mechanism that establishes a balance between opposing forces, but rather on the 
coordinated efforts of a central authority that combines the production of rules, the activity 
of judging and the monitoring of policy application. Consequently, MontesƋuieu͛s thƌee-
power structure is considered obsolete and replaced by the concept of aŶ ͞effiĐieŶt aŶd 
ĐoheƌeŶt͟ exercise of power, according to which courts should break with the tradition that 
insists that they cling to a concentration on judging. In this context, Judicial Policy Making 
should be part of the modern concept of the state. Judges should become policy makers 
because policy making has become the main way of describing governmental action (Feeley 
& Rubin, 1998).  
Thus, it is possible to claim that the managerialization of justice is part of a managerial 
concept of government, and that this presupposes a managerialization of law, which 
specialists in public law speak about in their reflections on governance and law. A study of 
the reform of the judicial map in France in 2008 confirms this correspondence (Commaille, 
2009). This process was marked primarily by an attempt to get around parliament. In 
choosing to launch the reform through decrees, rather than through an Act, the promoters 
of the reform were visibly trying to avoid a debate with parliament, since the history of the 
judicial map teaches us that it often constitutes an obstacle to all alterations in this matter. 
As happened with the reform that took place in France in 1958 (Commaille, 2007), there was 
here a desire on the part of the executive to reappropriate control over a reform process 
that was running the risk of being contested or even annulled by the legislative branch. 
However, in avoiding parliament, there was a transfer of the debate and of the expression of 
power relations from this space to the council of state. The breadth of the resources 
deployed was then in accordance with the mobilizations that the reform provoked. 
Paradoxically, in the light of what we might generally consider to be an impoverishment of 
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the legal field in this process, these mobilizations entered the terrain of political struggle by 
resorting to the legal field, represented by the recourse against the founding decrees of the 
reform. The real threat that such a strategy might pose cannot be better illustrated than in 
the ͞ƌeŶuŶĐiatioŶ͟ of the iŶitial deĐƌees that ĐoŶstituted the legal grounds of the reform and 
the recourse to the ͞siŵple͟ deĐƌee, ǁhiĐh eŶaďled a power confrontation of uncertain 
outcome to be avoided within the ͞laǁ faĐtoƌǇ͟ of the ĐouŶĐil of state. The choice of this 
stƌategǇ of ͞siŵple͟ deĐƌee at the (provisional?) end of a reform process is clearly an 
extreme example of the instrumentalization of the legal field, which is put at the service of a 
managerial model of government. In short, the main aspects of this reform were as follows: 
the extreme fragility of its legal grounds, suppression measures that strictly obeyed an 
͞aĐĐouŶtiŶg model,͟ and disqualification of the conciliation device, since the Advisory 
Committee of the judicial map, created at the beginning of the process but which never met, 
was in practice replaced by the hasty work of a small group of actors related to the Ministry 
of Justice. All these aspects constitute an unequivocal example of the shift from a ͞juƌidiĐal 
state͟ to a ͞ŵaŶageƌial state͟ ;Caillosse, ϮϬϬϵͿ, iŶ this Đase involving an increasingly evident 
kiŶd of ͞political marketing.͟ Priority is given to efficiency and performance rather than to 
the regularity and legitimacy of state interventions. We aƌe pushiŶg ďaĐk ͞the legal culture 
of regularity in favour of a result-based ŵaŶageƌial Đultuƌe͟ (Caillosse, 2009; 2008), and all 
this, fiŶallǇ, iŶ the Ŷaŵe of a ͞laǁless goǀeƌŶaŶĐe,͟ iŶ the ǁoƌds of oŶe authoƌ (Mockle, 
2007).  
 
2. Legal regulation as democratization process 
The teƌŵ ͞judiĐializatioŶ͟ ;as iŶ ͞the judiĐializatioŶ of soĐietǇ͟ aŶd ͞judicialization of 
politiĐs͟Ϳ is Ŷoǁ iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ used to desĐƌiďe the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ƌole of justiĐe has 
supposedly been exteŶded to the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of soĐial ƌelatioŶs, the ͞pƌoďleŵs of soĐietǇ,͟ 
tƌaŶsgƌessioŶs ;fƌoŵ ĐoŵŵoŶ deliŶƋueŶĐǇ to politiĐal deliŶƋueŶĐǇ, ĐoƌƌuptioŶ aŶd ͞Đƌiŵes 
agaiŶst huŵaŶitǇ͟Ϳ, aŶd the ƌegulatioŶ of eĐoŶoŵiĐ eǆĐhaŶges ;Coŵŵaille & DuŵouliŶ, 
2009). This ͞judiĐializatioŶ͟ does Ŷot oŶlǇ manifest itself in an increase in litigation brought 
before institutionalized and professionalized justice, but it may coexist with a decrease in 
litigation (we should note the case of civil justice in Quebec), as new forms of justice emerge. 
I will not go into what, in this oďseƌǀatioŶ of ͞judiĐializatioŶ,͟ derives from actual fact, from 
a growing demand and expectation in relation to justice, and what derives from the social 
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representations of legal professionals seeking to substantiate this supposed reality. The fact 
that ͞judiĐializatioŶ͟ has ďeeŶ heaǀilǇ deďated aŶd ǁƌitteŶ aďout at iŶteƌŶatioŶal leǀel 
(Commaille & Dumoulin, 2009) offers a strong indication that the matter of justice lies at the 
heart of the questions raised by contemporary societies concerning its functioning and its 
future, which are far beyond opinions about justice or the effective recourse to justice. 
Nothing demonstrates this better than aŶalǇses aďout the ͞judiĐializatioŶ of politiĐs.͟ This 
involves a global expansion of judicial power (Tate & Vallinder, 1995), meaning that 
͞deĐisioŶ-ŵakiŶg poǁeƌ is tƌaŶsfeƌƌed to the Đouƌts͟ ;FouƌŶieƌ & WoeƌlhiŶg, ϮϬϬϬͿ. 
͞JudiĐializatioŶ͟ is then defined as an increase in the power of courts in relation to the 
legislative and executive powers.  
How is this phenomenon of ͞judiĐializatioŶ͟ ŵaŶifested iŶ aŶalǇses? It is fƌeƋueŶtlǇ 
associated with what would be a process of democratization. Martin Shapiro considers that 
the legitimacy of the political regime may be accompanied by the intervention of justice in 
the allocation of economic resources or in the establishment of real social policies (Shapiro, 
1994). Thus, we see that, on the international level, the courts are, not infrequently, agents 
of public policy, and aspire to be so, even though many analyses emphasise their incapacity 
for this role (Horowitz, 1977). That is the case in the United States, where the courts 
intervene in matters of integration, police control, environmental protection, improvement 
of living conditions for the poorer members of society, and protection of civil rights, minority 
ƌights, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌights, etĐ. ;Hoƌoǁitz, ϭϵϳϳͿ. But similar developments have occurred in 
other countries, such as those of Latin America. In Colombia, the protection of social rights is 
guaranteed by the judiciary, and the courts and Constitutional Court intervene on matters of 
economic policy, especially by annulling laws to raise VAT on essential products, ordering the 
paƌtial iŶdeǆatioŶ of eŵploǇees͛ salaƌies, eǆteŶdiŶg retirement pensions to certain groups of 
the population that had been excluded, prohibiting the elimination of benefits for 
pensioners, etc. (Uprimny Yepes, 2007).  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͞judiĐializatioŶ͟ is ŵaŶifested eǀeŶ ŵoƌe iŶ areas that concern the general 
principles of democracy, thereby justifying its association with the idea of democratization. 
Thus, there has been an increase in the importance of the role of the Supreme Courts with 
regard to social progress, the defence of human rights and those of the weakest or more 
disadvantaged members of society, equal opportunities, etc. Some authors speak of a 
͞‘ights ‘eǀolutioŶ͟ (Epp, 1998), which gives common citizens access to the benefits of 
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justice, as this is grounded in the defence, acquisition and reinforcement of new rights. 
These judicial policies are believed to be more effective if they are based upon a dynamic 
civil society and provision of public funds, that is, a ͞support structure for legal mobilization͟ 
(Epp, 1998). In India, the role of the Supreme Court is growing with regard to the promotion 
of democratic principles, a more substantial concept of equality, supervision of electoral 
processes, etc. (Mehta, 2007). This may be illustrated by Public Interest Litigation, which 
permits all citizens to appeal if they have been victims of an injustice (an ͞alleged eǀil͟Ϳ 
(Mehta, 2007).  
This intrusion of justice into the political sphere may be supported by forms of justice that 
are quite different from the institutionalized form represented by the Supreme Court. Thus, 
͞Tƌuth aŶd ‘eĐoŶĐiliatioŶ͟ Đoŵŵittees aƌe iŶ faĐt foƌŵs of justiĐe that ŵeƌelǇ make use of 
legal ƌules, thus ďƌeakiŶg the laǁ pƌofessioŶals͛ ŵoŶopolǇ oŶ justiĐe, dƌaǁiŶg iŶspiƌatioŶ 
fƌoŵ the idea of ƌestoƌatiǀe justiĐe, to fuŶĐtioŶ as ͞structures of democratization and social 
paĐifiĐatioŶ͟ ;LefƌaŶĐ, ϮϬϬϳͿ. FiŶallǇ, iŶ this pƌoĐess of ͞judiĐializatioŶ͟ of politiĐs, it is useful 
to assess the influence of the justice professionals themselves, as is suggested by the 
example of the process of establishing the notion of universal jurisdiction (even if politics 
and nation states are maintained as important agents in the process) (Seroussi, 2009).  
This analysis of the new role played by justice in the social and political regulation of 
contemporary societies should also take account of the new relations between the citizens 
themselves and justice, and the new relations of organized forms of mobilization within civil 
society, i.e. social movements. No one analyses this aspect better than the American author 
Michael McCann, particularly in his book Rights at Work (1994). In this perspective, the 
mobilisation of law, especially to reinforce the power of marginalized citizens or even the 
power of ordinary citizens, is part of a political process. According to Michael McCann, law 
simultaneously provides normative principles and strategic resources for the materialization 
of social struggles. Empirical support for his analysis was principally provided by the 
collective actions brought by trade union jurists with respect to pay equity in the United 
States, particularly with regard to women, but also involving individuals that are poorly paid 
or undervalued due to their sexual orientation or ethnicity.  
Thus, for Michael McCann, using law and justice as a resource, transforming them into 
favoured instruments in the repertoire of collective action of social movements, leads to the 
establishment of a true bottom-up jurisprudence. Moreover, the effects of these strategies in 
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relation to law and justice are not only real and concrete but also symbolic, as they act upon 
citizens͛ representations of that to which they are subjected and of the possible role of law 
and justice, until they acquire a rights consciousness, an awareness of rights in general or of 
their rights in particular. Canadian studies offer other examples of these mobilizations of 
justice by civil society, of this shift of political space toward legal-judicial space, in order to 
deal with problems which, in principle, fall into the political sphere. Such mobilizations are 
also encouraged by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 – for example, 
recourse to courts as a political strategy considering that the reference to fundamental 
rights may be a privileged means for establishing the ideology of ͞gaǇ liďeƌatioŶ͟ (Smith, 
2005; Morton & Allen, 2001).  
These new investments in justice are likely to favour the emergence of new forms of 
justiĐe, suĐh as ͞Houses of JustiĐe aŶd Laǁ,͟ ͞CeŶtƌes foƌ PƌoǆiŵitǇ JustiĐe,͟ oƌ eǀeŶ 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration and alternative forms of conflict resolution. Lay actors 
(new professionals in the social field, movement activists, and even people in elected 
positions at local level) aim to take their place in these structures in order to be involved in 
the exercise of justice anchored in the new territories of social problems (Lejeune, 2007).  
These new demands by civil society for a new bottom-up form of justice acquire even 
more importance as they are part of a trend towards transnationalization. In this context, 
social movements are increasingly involved in a worldwide civil society that leads them to 
rethink their strategies and renew their repertoire of collective action, particularly as regards 
possible uses of the judicial arena. This is particularly evident in the domains of ecology, 
uƌďaŶisŵ, ŵiŶoƌitǇ ƌights, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌights, aŶd oďǀiouslǇ the economy (see the above 
reference to the analyses made by the Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development 
Research Chair, University of Quebec, Montreal).  
These trends towards the reappropriation of justice by citizens and the movements 
representing them are accompanied and supported by justice professionals, within the 
framework of cause lawyering, that is, the work of lawyers who, according to Austin Sarat 
and Stuart Scheingold, rather than fulfilling their traditional function of representing their 
ĐlieŶts͛ iŶteƌests, use their talents and any resources at their disposal to achieve political and 
social goals and promote their cause (Sarat & Scheingold, 2006). The specific influence of the 
legal professionals is also manifested in the context of a movement that has been called 
political lawyering, in which lawyers contribute to the advancement of political liberalism, 
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that is, the transformation of law and the state and the defence of iŶdiǀiduals͛ fuŶdaŵeŶtal 
rights and freedoms (Halliday et al., 2007).
2
  
 
3. Legal regulation as a process of neoliberalization  
We are in a context in which, typically, the return of economic liberalism is translated by a 
double movement of state decline in the economic and social domains. This movement 
accompanies the restoration of values of individual freedom, initiative and responsibility 
demanded by those that defend the primacy of the market. The classical counterpart to this 
is the return to state control in the penal domain, which attests to an international tendency 
toǁaƌds ͞oǀeƌ-peŶalizatioŶ͟ ;“alas, ϮϬϬϱͿ, illustƌated ďǇ iŶĐƌeased ƌepƌessioŶ of ŵiŶoƌs to 
the detriment of prevention, oƌ ďǇ ǁhat oŶe authoƌ Đalls ͞peŶalizatioŶ of the social͟ ;Maƌry, 
2003). The recurring reference to the rule of law simultaneously manifests a desire for 
greater market autonomy and a restoration of the penal. In this context, in which increased 
importance is given to the economic paradigm (Hall, 1993) and the market referential 
(Jobert, 1994), the weakening of the political dimension and the redefinition of the status of 
the state, concomitant with a growth in individual rights and a loss of faith in the social state, 
contribute to give the judge, in addition to a restored repressive function, a growing role as 
regulator in the management of social relations and economic exchanges and in the 
functioning of a policy that is endogenously constructed in the framework of social 
interactions, specifically in the judicial space.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, the judge͛s Ŷeǁ ƌole does Ŷot siŵplǇ ƌesult fƌoŵ these deǀelopŵeŶts; theǇ aƌe 
also promoted by the judges themselves. For example, Ran Hirschl (2004), observing a strong 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal teŶdeŶĐǇ toǁaƌds a ͞juƌistoĐƌaĐǇ,͟ examines how the interplay between 
economic elites and judicial elites contribute to this. According to this author, the actions of 
the judicial elite, particularly those operating in the Supreme Courts, tend to be inspired in 
individualistic liberal values (including on matters of customs) and opposed to the principles 
underlying the welfare state, which justified the existence of redistributive justice 
(manifested in the importance given to trade unions and social rights such as minimum 
salary, housing, social protection, etc). Thus, the triumph of the ͞juƌistoĐƌaĐǇ͟ is associated 
with the decline of an egalitarian vision in socioeconomic matters and adherence to the 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted, however, that this thesis has been hotly debated (Commaille, 2009). 
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values of economic liberalism. In addition to the practices of the judges of the Supreme 
Courts, this new justice system is adapted to the new transnational boundaries of the 
market. Thus, we have seen the emergence of a transnational power exercised by agents 
iŶǀested ǁith the fuŶĐtioŶs of ͞justiĐe,͟ such as the experts of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the judges 
operating in the various European tribunals or international criminal courts. New scales of 
judicial action are demanded to respond to the desire to ensure legal safety for economic 
ageŶts fƌoŵ ͞peƌipheƌal ĐouŶtƌies͟ oƌ fƌoŵ EuƌopeaŶ ĐouŶtƌies pƌeǀiouslǇ ďeloŶgiŶg to the 
Soviet bloc. Supranational institutions like the World Bank, the European Commission and 
US Aid thus aim to promote the application of justice systems that can guarantee the 
credibility, stability and security necessary for trade by modernizing and rationalizing the 
judicial system, ensuring its autonomy in relation to politics and providing training for 
magistrates. For these supranational institutions, it is important to reduce the 
unpredictability of a judicial system that might constitute an obstacle to the development 
and growth of the market. For some, this attention given to justice aims less at instituting 
the rule of law than a state-eŶdoƌsed ͞ƌule of ďusiŶess͟ ;“eŶ, ϮϬϬϬͿ.  
In Japan, justice reform clearly points to an increasingly close connection between 
economic liberalism and justice, with the active participation of legal professionals. The 
pressure exerted by Japanese employers seems to have ďeeŶ deĐisiǀe foƌ justiĐe ƌefoƌŵ ͞iŶ 
the context of a market economy that ǀalues iŶdiǀidual iŶitiatiǀe͟ and in the name of a 
sǇsteŵ that guaƌaŶtees ͞total deƌegulatioŶ of the eĐoŶoŵǇ iŶ order to maintain 
competitiveness in a globalized competitive world͟ ;Takamura, 2007). This is what is 
effectively being undertaken by a liberal government with a view to increasing the number 
of judicial professions, setting up new Law Schools, fosteƌiŶg ͞the pƌiǀatizatioŶ of justiĐe 
through companies and associations,͟ which are encouraged to become agencies of conflict 
resolution within the framework of the basic laws about alternative forms of conflict 
resolution, in keeping with the general aim of promoting the adaptation of Japanese society 
to globalization (Takamura, 2007).  
Following these general principles inspired in economic liberalism, a dual policy of access 
to law and justice is explicitly endorsed, according to the principle of market segmentation 
of law and justice. This dualism implies that the privileged classes and economic agents have 
access to an institutionalized and professionalized justice, while disadvantaged groups have 
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access to a ͞lay͟ form of justice exerted by persons of uncertain competence. The problem 
becomes even more pertinent because, in the sphere of justice, a differentiation might arise 
between a sector dedicated to the management of interpersonal relations (such as the 
Portuguese justices of the peace) and a sector that responds to the needs of economic and 
administrative activities of organizations (Bastard & Guibentif, 2007).  
This neoliberal configuration is part of a pƌoĐess of ͞defoƌŵalizatioŶ͟ of laǁ aŶd justiĐe, in 
keepiŶg ǁith a ĐoŶteǆt of ͞ĐoŶtƌaĐtualizatioŶ͟ that ͞ŵaǇ ďe Ŷouƌished ďǇ aŶti-state 
positions, which aim more or less at the ŵodel of the ͚ŵiŶiŵal͛ state and an activation of 
civil society conceived as an atomized society connected by free voluntary exchanges͟ 
(Munck, 1995: 95).  
In the sphere of a form of justice connected to neoliberalization, the phenomenon of 
judicialization acquires another hue. Judicial power is here clearly perceived as an active part 
of the neoliberalization process, as it finds in it the means to increase its power to the point 
of becoming an obstacle to democratization. Nothing illustrates better the intensity of this 
belief and its justification than the title of an article about the multiplication of constitutional 
courts during the 1990s in regions belonging to Russia: ͞Less Democracy, More Courts͟ 
(Trochev, 2004). We might also mention the controversies raised by the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms of 1982, and the comments of one author for whom both the left and 
the right focused on the negative side of the growth of judicial power. The left lamented the 
fact that involvement in law presented a risk of depoliticization for social movements, while 
for the right, the Charter, in reinforcing the power of law and justice, made it possible for 
their professionals to enter the terrain of politics and policy production, thereby exceeding 
what ought to be their legal functions (Smith, 2005).  
For Ran Hirschl, there is in fact a strategic interplay between the political, economic and 
judicial elites to favour the judicialization movement. In his book Towards Juristocracy, 
Hirschl (2004) returns to the frequently mentioned observation that, throughout the world, 
at both national and supranational level, there has been an unprecedented transfer of 
power from representative institutions to judiciaries. Based on a comparative analysis 
involving four countries (Canada, New Zealand, Israel, South Africa), Hirschl argues that the 
expansion of the power of justice via constitutionalization bears witness to a desire to 
preserve hegemonic interests. It is part of a context of social, political and economic 
struggles that shape the political system, and therefore cannot be understood in isolation 
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from them. Thus the displacement of policy-making authority from majoritarian decision-
making arenas to judicial arenas should be attributed to the political and economic elites, 
who consider that their interests are thus better served.
3
 For Hirschl, those ͞ǁho aƌe eageƌ 
to pay the price of judicial empowerment must assume that their position (absolute or 
relative) would be improved under a juƌistoĐƌaĐǇ͟ ;HiƌsĐhl, ϮϬϬϰ: 11). This strategy is 
particularly developed by three key groups: political elites who feel threatened by new social 
groups and seek to preserve their interests and hegemony by bypassing democratic 
procedures, while professing support for democracy; economic elites, who perceive the 
constitutionalization of rights, particularly as regards property, mobility and employment, as 
a way of influencing government action and promoting a free market and an agenda 
favourable to their interests; and judicial elites and national high courts, which seek to 
strengthen their political influence and international reputation. In short, according to 
Hirschl, these are the strategic legal innovators (i.e. the political elites in association with the 
economic and judicial elites who have interests in common) which ͞determine the timing, 
extent, and nature of constitutional reforms͟ (Hirschl, 2004: 12).  
For Hirschl, Israel offers an excellent example of the increase in power of the Supreme 
Court. Martin Edelman (1994) had already called attention to the increase in appeals to this 
jurisdiction. He calculated that the number of cases increased by 632% between 1956 and 
1987, while in the same period the population grew by 230%; in 1987, the court received 
1466 petitions, seven times more than thirty years before. Moreover, this author observed 
that the Israeli Supreme Court had allowed itself more and more freedom in its 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s ďasiĐ laǁs (although there is no written constitution), largely 
invoking the rule of law and principles of natural law. For Edelman, the Israeli political 
system has thus changed, since the Supreme Court has now become an important political 
aĐtoƌ, haǀiŶg plaǇed oŶlǇ a seĐoŶdaƌǇ ƌole duƌiŶg the eaƌlǇ Ǉeaƌs of Isƌael͛s eǆisteŶĐe. IŶ fact, 
it seems to have moved from a role similar to that played by the House of Lords in the British 
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 The issue of judicialization thus reignites the traditional debate about which elites gain the most from 
recourse to justice, undermining the idea that justice can contribute to social change. See the famous analysis 
by Marc Galanter (1974) and the critical assessment of it by Kritzer & Silbey (2003); see also an analysis of a 
federal jurisdiction that concludes that jurisdictions may be more receptive than other political arenas to claims 
from disadvantaged groups, though they are also used by powerful social groups to reinforce their politically 
acquired gains (Olson, 1990).  
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system to one that is more comparable with that of the United States Supreme Court 
(Edelman, 1994).  
Hirschl, in accordance with his critical stance regarding judicialization, puts forward a 
three-point explanation to analyse the increase in Israeli judicial power: the hegemony of 
the elites is threatened by peripheral groups and their political orientation; judicial power 
benefits from a strong reputation for uprightness and impartiality; and jurisdictions have a 
tendency to decide in accordance with dominant ideological and cultural ideas (Hirschl, 
2004). This issue had been discussed in an article in which Hirschl (2001) emphasises that the 
constitutionalization of rights in Israel is the product of a strategic alliance between the 
dominant elites, their political representatives and legal professionals. He shows particularly 
that the Israeli Supreme Court shares the values of an urban elite belonging to the Ashkenazi 
bourgeoisie, and that this proximity is even greater, for the latter actually control 
appointments. The judicial power has even more chances of exerting its influence when 
there is a widespread belief in its impartiality. However, Hirschl observes that the 
representatives of peripheral minorities are increasingly opposing judicial empowerment. 
Occupying an increasingly important space, they are seeking to impose a return to 
majoritarian policy-making arenas.  
Summing up these observations in Towards Juristocracy, Hirschl stresses that, in the four 
countries studied, the growth of the judiciary is based on a strict conception of rights, based 
on Lockean individualism and on a dyadic and antistatist view of constitutional rights. This is, 
therefore, a way of protecting the private (human and economic) sphere from the pressures 
of the ͞ĐolleĐtiǀe͟ (often defined as the state and its forms of regulation). According to 
Hirschl, the high courts of the four countries view the state as a threat to human freedom 
and equality. For him, the legal discourse on rights is impregnated with all the fundamentals 
of social and economic neoliberalism, such as individualism, deregulation, the 
commodification of public services and reduction of public spending, inspired by anti-
statism, social atomism and the strict protection of the private sphere. In this spirit, what is 
endorsed is a procedural justice, less state intervention in the private sphere, and a general 
attitude of hostility toward claims for substantive equality, state regulation aŶd ǁoƌkeƌs͛ 
rights (Hirschl, 2004: 14; 147-8). Hirschl thus emphasises the existence of a global trend 
towards economic and social neoliberalism, visible in the four countries studied, with a 
weakening of the ͞Keynesian welfare state in favor of more market-oriented, ͚sŵall state͛ 
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economic policies͟ (Hirschl, 2004: 155). Obviously, for this author, these developments do 
not reinforce distributive justice or improve the situation of disadvantaged groups.  
In his conclusion, Hirschl suggests that the empowerment of the judiciary is likely to 
become more accentuated with the creation of supranational jurisdictions (he gives the 
European Court of Justice as an example) or even relatively autonomous agencies, such as 
the national central banks and the European Central Bank, or even transnational trade 
treaties. All this illustrates a trend towards the establishment of quasi-judicial procedures in 
differeŶt seĐtoƌs, aŶd the tƌaŶsfeƌ of ͞poliĐǇ-making prerogatives from majoritarian decision-
making arenas to relatively insulated domestic and transnational policy-making bodies͟ 
(Hirschl, 2004: 216).  
 
Conclusion 
After analysing these three types of legal regulation of the economy, it is possible to extract 
two opposing forms of legal and judicial status in relation to the political. In the first, the 
legal-judicial dimension is a central element in political regulation, which can be illustrated 
by the three-part governance model defined by Alec Stone Sweet. For this author, the 
judicialization of dispute resolution is the process by means of which a TDR (triadic dispute 
resolution) mechanism arises, stabilises and develops authority over the normative structure 
responsible for managing exchange in a particular community (Shapiro & Stone Sweet, 2002; 
Stone Sweet, 1999). For Alec Stone Sweet, this triad constitutes an essential mechanism of 
political change. In fact, the movement from dyad to triad corresponds to the advent of a 
particular form of governance that has to do with regulating behaviours and maintaining 
social cohesion in a context of change. The introduction of a new scale, manifested through 
the phenomenon of judicialization, ͞progressively shapes the strategic behavior of political 
actors engaged in interactions with one another͟ (Stone Sweet, 1999: 71) and leads, finally, 
to the gradual but inevitable redefinition of the nature of governance itself (Stone Sweet, 
1999: 86).  
The second form of legal-judicial status by reference to the political is marked by 
instrumentalization: either due to a prevailing concern for rationalization which leads law 
and justice to suffer a loss of meaning in favour of a managerial model that governs their 
application; or because law is placed at the service of a political marketing corresponding to 
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a distorted conception of the political; or still when law and justice become instruments at 
the service of social agents and economic operators.  
If we admit the existence of these two forms, it is possible to speak of a Janus model of 
legal regulation. But, as we have seen, this model is constructed in relation to the political, 
and this says more about the status of the political than about legal-judicial status. Legal 
regulation is systemically interconnected with political regulation. From this point of view, 
the Janus model of legal regulation immediately reveals a crisis in the political, specifically in 
the political model of representative democracy.  
In the first form of legal-judicial status in relation to the political, the increasing 
supremacy of the legal-judicial means a weakening of the political. Thus, there is a kind of 
overinvestment in justice by default of the political, as the latter is unable to represent and 
impose a metareason.  
CitizeŶs […] haǀe tuƌŶed toǁaƌds JustiĐe, ƌesoƌtiŶg to it to Đompensate foƌ the ͞deŵoĐƌatiĐ 
defiĐit͟ of political decision-making, which has become subordinated to management, and to 
provide society with a symbolic reference that present representation offers increasingly less. 
(Ringelheim, 1997)  
 
Justice is the receptacle for a civilizational unease that exceeds it and questions the actors that 
constitute a society. The crisis in justice expresses the fear of insecurity produced by the 
mutation iŶ a ŵodel of soĐietǇ […] BehiŶd the failuƌe of justiĐe, it is deŵoĐƌaĐǇ that is being 
sought, and it is politics as an institution in a common world that is at stake. (Cartuyvels & 
Marry, 1997)  
We can thus interpret the observation of Louise Arbour, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, as the expression of the need to impose upon the political 
a higher rationality which, from now on, only justice can offer: ͞JustiĐe has ƌeasoŶs which 
politiĐal ƌeasoŶ does Ŷot kŶoǁ͟ ;Le Monde, 8th February 2007). We can include in the same 
line of reasoning a doctrinal current within the judicial sphere which, basing itself on the 
idea of the ŶeĐessaƌǇ ƌehaďilitatioŶ of a ͞thiƌd poǁeƌ͟ embodied by the judge in the context 
of ƋuestioŶiŶg the ͞JaĐoďiŶ ‘epuďliĐ͟ aŶd ͞ƌepuďliĐaŶ legiĐeŶtƌisŵ͟ (Gauchet, 1995, 
Rosanvallon, 2002), professes a new role for the judge as arbitrator between civil society and 
the state (Salas, 1998) or iŶstitutes it as the ͞guaƌdiaŶ͟ of democratic promises (Garapon, 
1996). In this perspective, it is up to law and justice to confer a reason, being invested or 
overinvested as political reason by default of the political.  
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In the second form of legal-judicial status in relation to the political, the 
instrumentalization of the legal and judicial is no more than an expression of another form 
of weakening of the political, of a political unable to define itself in accordance with its 
purposes or subordinated to economic logic, that is, the logic of means rather than ends.  
It remains for us to explore the meaning of these expressions that sprout from the legal-
judicial system and that contribute to the same phenomenon of decline of the political. Be it 
as it may, at this moment it seems that drawing on political sociology to analyse law and 
justice, as defined at the beginning and as I have tried to explain in this article, introduces a 
much broader question than the one that concerns the prospects for the development of 
the political – the emergence of new regimes of political regulation. Finally, the question 
that remains concerns the reorientations necessary for these political regulation systems to 
ensure the effective realisation of the democratic project, seeking to know how law and 
justice may ultimately contribute to the restoration of the political.  
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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